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Drought Relief and the Origins of a 
Conservative Welfare State in 
Botswana, 1965-1980 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Drought played – and continues to play – a central role in welfare state-
building across much of Africa. Botswana was perhaps the first major case of 
this, with drought in the mid-1960s prompting policy reforms that were to lead 
to the construction, decades later, of an extensive but conservative welfare state. 
Drought forced the colonial government and then the government headed by 
Seretse Khama to address aspects of poverty that might otherwise have been 
ignored. Emergency food aid was replaced by school and other feeding 
programmes, food-for-work programmes, and modest food relief for other 
‘destitutes’. Drought relief in Botswana in the 1960s and 1970s was provided 
not only on an unprecedented scale but was also institutionalised through 
programmes administered by a dedicated national and local bureaucracy, 
independent of the chiefs, and in association with a new international agency, 
the World Food Programme. Drought also prompted and shaped the 
development of a normative doctrine of public welfare provision and a new 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the newly independent state to 
its citizens. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At independence in 1966, most Batswana were poor and malnourished, almost 
no children went to secondary school, and health care was limited. The 
government was dependent on massive budget support from Britain. Moreover, 
the new country was surrounded by South Africa, South African-occupied 
South-West Africa, and the settler state of Southern Rhodesia, with only the 
ferry crossing over the Zambezi at Kazungula connecting it to another non-
settler state (and even this connection was cut temporarily after the Southern 
Rhodesians bombed the ferry in 1979). Over the following twenty years, 
however, Botswana’s diamond-fuelled economy grew faster than any other 
economy in the world, with an average annual growth rate of about 8 percent. 
By 1998 GDP per capita in Botswana was, in real terms, ten times higher than at 
independence.  
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Whilst the state saw itself – and has been seen – primarily as a successful 
‘developmental state’, it also rebuilt itself as a welfare state, albeit a 
conservative one. Public education and health care expanded. By the late 1980s 
almost all children were completing primary school and progressing to 
secondary school, and secondary school enrolment was rising steadily (passing 
50 percent in the early 1990s). The ratio of doctors to people rose fourfold by 
1989. Almost all births were attended by trained medical personnel and almost 
all children were immunised against major diseases. The under-five child 
mortality rate halved between 1966 and 1982.1 More unusually, provision for 
the poor expanded through institutionalised public employment programmes, 
social pensions for the elderly, school and other feeding programmes, and grants 
for orphans. By the 2000s, Botswana had an extensive but parsimonious welfare 
state, focused on economic growth and social stability but protecting most of its 
citizens against extreme poverty. Almost all children and many adults received 
free food rations, and one in ten people received individual cash transfers, often 
on behalf of their entire households. The state provided a de facto guarantee 
against not only starvation but also severe malnutrition, during non-drought as 
well as drought years (Seekings, 2016a; Hamer, 2016).2  
 
Much of the expansion of welfare provision was formalised in the 1990s and 
2000s. First, in 1991, drought relief was formally institutionalised in the 
country’s 7th National Development Plan, meaning that budgets were planned in 
advance. Old-age pensions were introduced in 1996. In 1997, the government 
took over the school feeding programme from the World Food Programme 
(WFP). Concern over AIDS orphans led to the adoption of an Orphan Care 
Programme.3 These reforms were framed by the adoption, in 1997, of Vision 
2016, which set out principles for national development in what Werbner 
characterises as the founding “ideological manifesto” of the country’s leadership 
(Werbner, 2004: 17). Other poverty-focused policies were reformed, and a 
National Strategy for Poverty Reduction was finalised in 2003. Public 
employment programmes were expanded. 
 
A series of scholars have shown that these initiatives had roots in preceding 
decades. Holm and Morgan first drew attention to the strong and effective relief 
programmes mounted in the early 1980s (Holm & Morgan, 1985; Valentine, 
1993: but see Simmons & Lyons, 1992). Wylie (1989) noted the presence of 
drought relief in the 1980s, in apparent contrast to the absence of any such relief 
																																								 																				
1 Data from the World Bank’s ‘World Development Indicators’ (see 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators); see also Botswana 
(1991). 
2 With the important caveat that the San population was neglected (Good, 1999; Saugestad, 
2001). 
3 See forthcoming work by Isaac Chinyoka. 
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in the 1930s and 1940s. Solway (1994) described the drought of the 1980s as a 
‘watershed event’, precipitating dramatic changes in both the practice and the 
meaning of public policy as the state inserted itself in new ways into the lives of 
its citizens. The case of Botswana drew international applause also. De Waal 
(1997) identified the early 1980s drought relief programme as exemplary. Other 
scholars point to the antecedent of the 1978-79 drought. Von Braun, Teklu & 
Webb assert that Botswana’s drought relief program “began in the late 1970s 
and was put to the test in the 1978-79 drought” (Von Braun, Teklu & Webb, 
1999: 146). Munemo also traces the roots of Botswana’s drought relief policy to 
the drought of 1978-79 as well as the much more severe drought of 1981-86 
(Munemo, 2012).  
 
In this paper I argue that the basic programmatic and institutional architecture of 
drought relief and hence the welfare state in Botswana can be traced back even 
earlier, to the drought that preceded and accompanied independence in 
September 1966, and the drought relief operation that was implemented in 
response.4 In a companion paper, I show also that the drought shaped 
fundamentally the ideological framework developed by Seretse Khama, the 
country’s first Prime Minister (1965-66) and then president, his vice-president 
(and successor) Quett Masire and their Bechuanaland (and then Botswana) 
Democratic Party (BDP) between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. Analysing 
speeches, party documents and state documents reveals how drought framed the 
BDP leadership’s understanding of not only poverty5 but also and more broadly 
the roles of state, market and kin in meeting people’s basic needs in the new 
Botswana (Seekings, 2016b). Drought thus led to both the architecture of policy 
and institutions, and a corresponding doctrine of welfare provision. 
 
In conjunction with the WFP, the government of Botswana adopted a three-fold 
approach to drought, comprising food-for-work programmes for the able-bodied 
(forming the basis of ‘self-help’ projects), feeding programmes for school-
children and ‘vulnerable groups’, and (at least in principle) ‘destitute’ relief for 
the elderly and other poor who were without (or had been abandoned by) kin. 
The cost was the equivalent of at least 2 percent of GDP in drought years and at 
least 1 percent of GDP on average, with direct benefits reaching perhaps one 
																																								 																				
4 Only Picard seems to have noted the institutionalisation of drought relief in the 1960s. 
“Early food distribution was of an emergency nature, but as the worst effects of the drought 
were halted, it became government policy to link food supplement programs with village self-
help projects” through food-for-work programmes funded from the government’s 
development budget and administered through newly-established village development 
committees (Pickard, 1987: 235-6). The general neglect of the earlier period might be due to 
the paucity of researchers until the late 1970s, and the fact that the University of Botswana 
was only opened in 1982. 
5 See Werbner (2004: 19-20) for a discussion of ‘understood poverty’ in Botswana. 
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half of the population. Even before the 1978-79 drought it was clear that 
Botswana needed to institutionalise its response to drought and poverty rather 
than respond in an ad hoc manner. Drought and drought relief were shaped by 
and in turn shaped the ideology being developed within the BDP. The BDP 
celebrated rural life, self-help and community, weaving these into a conservative 
ideology of social justice that decried excessive inequality and legitimated 
targeted interventions. Both the emergency policies and the emerging doctrine 
provided foundations for the subsequent institutionalisation of a conservative 
welfare state. 
 
Tilly (1975) famously remarked that “wars make states” as much as “states 
make war”. This is in part because wars sometimes require states, especially 
democratic states, to forge new social contracts with their citizens through social 
and economic policies. Droughts and other disasters also play an important if 
generally neglected role in state-building – including in the USA. Dauber (2013) 
demonstrates how federal intervention in the economy in the 1930s (i.e. the New 
Deal) was premised on a long history of federal disaster relief. The poor could 
be represented as deserving because they were blameless in the face of mixed 
natural and ‘man-made’ economic disasters, as shown in the enduringly 
poignant photographs of Dorothea Lange and the novels of John Steinbeck, and 
as argued in Congress and the courts. The New Deal welfare state could provide 
for able-bodied adults not because of any acceptance of universalistic 
conceptions of citizenship or even need – as in much of north-west Europe – but 
because the Depression was represented as being as a natural calamity that had 
overwhelmed the ability of ordinary people to provide for themselves and 
transformed them into the deserving poor.  
 
The USA was unusual among the advanced capitalist countries in that the risks 
prompting welfare-state-building included the risk of drought. In Africa and 
South Asia, however, drought (and to a much lesser extent floods) played a 
major role in welfare-state-building. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Britain sought 
to steer its colonies down the path of ‘development’ in explicit contrast to the 
path of ‘welfare’ that had been laid out for Britain itself in the 1942 Beveridge 
Report (Seekings, 2010). Colonial officials embraced an agrarian doctrine of 
development that sought to transform struggling smallholders into thriving 
peasants through massive interventions in agricultural production and marketing 
(Low & Lonsdale, 1976; Cooper, 1997; Beinart, 1984). Whilst men in some 
areas were encouraged or pushed into migrant labour, permanent urbanisation 
(and ‘detribalisation’) was generally discouraged (or prevented). ‘Social 
welfare’ officers would solve through ‘community development’ the ‘problems’ 
(such as ‘juvenile delinquency’) that arose in urban settings where ‘traditional’ 
norms and relations had regrettably broken down (Lewis, 2000; Fourchard, 
2006). In a few other colonies (including Mauritius and Barbados), de-
	
	
	 5 
agrarianisation propelled British colonial officials towards welfare reforms 
along British lines, including especially old-age pensions (Seekings, 2007, 
2011). Across most of Africa, however, an agrarian doctrine of development and 
welfare held sway. In these colonies, drought posed a particularly fundamental 
challenge to this approach, because it revealed the limits to this ideal agrarian 
model. The rising tide of nationalist demands for independence fuelled the 
imperative of mitigating the consequences of drought. Arid Botswana was on 
the frontline of state-building in response to this challenge. 
 
Solway has interpreted the droughts in Botswana between 1979 and 1987 in 
terms of the concept of a ‘revelatory crisis’ (a concept borrowed from Marshall 
Sahlins’ Stone Age Economics (1972: 128, 141, 143). For Solway, herself rooted 
in Marxian political economy, the drought exposed the ‘structural 
contradictions’ in the ‘existing order’ during a ‘critical historical juncture’ in 
Botswana:  
 
‘Structural contradictions such as those between household and 
kindred, between individualised and communal property claims, 
between production for market and production for subsistence, 
between the state’s vision of “rational” peasant production and the 
realities of daily economic life in the rural areas, and those between 
classes, were revealed to varying degrees and in different ways both to 
the outside observer and to the participants themselves’.  
 
Not only had conditions in rural areas deteriorated irreversibly, in part through 
commercialisation and class formation, but the state’s response entailed 
inserting itself ‘in the lives of citizens in new and expanded ways’. At the same 
time, she suggests (without much discussion), the drought served as ‘a perfect 
scapegoat’, obscuring the underlying ‘socio-economic problems’, in part 
through ideological innovation (Solway, 1994: 471-3).   
 
My analysis in this paper is informed by Solway’s analysis, but goes beyond it 
in several respects. First, I argue that the policy and ideological frameworks 
predated the 1979-87 droughts, and should be traced back to the droughts of the 
1960s. Secondly, locating the ‘crisis’ in the 1960s rather than the 1980s requires 
that more attention is paid to the nature of the new state and less to class 
formation. Thirdly, the importance of drought was not only that it revealed 
underlying social or economic shifts, but also that it demanded – in the political 
context of the 1960s – immediate and practical programmatic and institutional 
reforms. Finally, as I show not here but in the companion paper, ideological 
production cannot be simply read off the underlying crisis: Khama, Masire and 
the BDP chose how to respond, practically and ideologically.  
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Drought and relief in Britain’s colonies 
 
British colonial officials in Africa lagged behind their counterparts in India in 
terms of developing drought relief programmes. In India, in the nineteenth 
century, famines prompted the appointment of a series of official Commissions 
of Enquiry and the elaboration of famine relief policy (Sharma, 2001). The 
secretary of the 1878-80 Famine Commission drafted a ‘Famine Code’ that set 
out how to anticipate and respond to famine. Famine Codes enshrined a 
discourse that Indian nationalists used in criticism of imperial inaction, forcing 
the imperial authorities into an unwritten contract to prevent famine – although 
this contract failed spectacularly in Bengal in 1942-43, when the imperial 
government failed to ensure either adequate supplies of food at prices that the 
poor could afford (Brennan, 1988).  
 
The drought relief proposed by the Famine Codes reflected nineteenth century 
liberal thought in Britain: free food should be limited to the truly ‘destitute’ 
whilst the able-bodied poor should earn food through food-for-work 
programmes. As the imperial administration explained in the preface to the 1888 
Punjab Famine Code, it was the ‘duty of Government to organize operations for 
the relief of distress and mortality’ when a natural calamity affected ‘a material 
portion of the population in any locality’, going beyond their capacity to 
remedy. Measures should not ‘check thrift or impair the existing structure of 
Native society. … Gratuitous relief therefore, either in the form of house-to-
house relief, or of relief at poor-houses, must be restricted as far as possible; and 
the leading principle n which assistance will be based will be the provision of 
work for all who are able to earn their living.’ Relief work should be piece-
work, and the wage should be ‘the lowest amount sufficient to maintain healthy 
life under given circumstances. While the duty of the Government is to save life, 
it is not bound to maintain the laboring community at its normal level of 
comfort. To do so would be unjust to other sections of the community, besides 
prolonging the period for which the laboring population would cling to the relief 
works.’ In addition to discussing in detail arrangements for both relief work and 
gratuitous relief (in either cash or grain), the Code also laid out measures for the 
preservation of cattle.6  
 
The Famine Codes (and subsequent manuals) were passed on at independence 
and embraced by the new Indian Government. McAlpin (1987: 401) quotes an 
Indian civil servant in 1958 saying that this combination was in part “to 
minimize the charity aspect of relief by associating it with some kind of useful 
work so as to prevent a dole mentality and consequent demoralisation”. 
																																								 																				
6 ‘Remarks’, preface to the Punjab Famine Code 1888 (British Library, India Office Records 
V/27/831/51). 
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Colonial officials in Africa faced regular famines, and sometimes responded 
with limited relief programmes. Officials in the Sudan borrowed from the Indian 
Famine Code to draft their 1920 Sudan Famine Regulations (De Waal, 1989), 
although they lacked the administrative capacity of the Indian colonial state and 
conditions were very different in that famine in Sudan was not the consequence 
of insufficient opportunities for employment, as was the case in India, which 
meant that public employment programmes were less appropriate (De Waal, 
1997). In South Africa, as in India, the state had long recognised that it had to 
play an active role despite a generally efficient private trading system and 
widespread migrant labour. Maize was purchased, if necessary from abroad, and 
dispensed by magistrates as ‘pauper rations’ and for ‘relief work’ (i.e. food-for-
work on public works programmes). In 1946, £26,000 was allocated to 
magistrates to respond to famine in the Eastern Cape (Wylie, 2001: Ch. 3). 
Famine and malnutrition in the Eastern Cape were a significant factor in 
demands (including from both magistrates and the employers of rural migrant 
labourers) for the South African old-age pension programme to be extended to 
black men and women. In 1944, the government acceded to these demands 
(Seekings, 2005). 
 
In Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), officials “developed a system of relief 
comparable to (but apparently not drawn directly from) the Indian Famine 
Codes” (Iliffe, 1990: 10). In the Southern Rhodesian case,  
 
‘famine policy … rested on two principles. One, already orthodox 
policy in India and South Africa, was to rely wherever possible on 
private trade. …  The second principle … was that men should earn 
money to buy food by migrating to wage employment, the demand for 
labour being such at this time that there was no suggestion of opening 
the public works which were the normal means of relieving famine in 
the labour-surplus societies of India’ (ibid: 38-9).  
 
Officials’ liberal economic instincts were challenged when the market failed to 
provide sufficient food at affordable prices. In each of four successive famines – 
in 1903, 1912, 1916 and 1922 – officials went further in securing and 
transporting food supplies, and dispensing food from distribution centres to 
‘destitutes’ for free and to able-bodied adults on credit or in return for labour on 
road-building or other public works programmes. But officials subsequently 
backtracked on their earlier benevolence. Through the 1930s, ‘40s and ‘50s, they 
relied entirely on private traders supplying food to drought-affected areas, and 
migrants’ remittances paying for it, so that the state was not required to organise 
any relief operations (ibid).  
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In the face of severe drought in southern parts of Nyasaland (later Malawi) in 
1949, colonial officials organised a minimalist drought relief programme, first 
for the small urban population (in Blantyre) then for the very much larger rural 
population (in the surrounding countryside). Food distribution focused on the 
sale of food rations. “The government was determined to keep free issues to the 
minimum, and initially reserved these for the old and inform”, writes Vaughan. 
Faced with cashless poor people, and “in order not to increase the number of 
free issues, District Commissioners began organising ‘food-for-work’ schemes, 
whereby able-bodied men and women could earn the food they were required 
but were unable to buy”. As evidence of severe malnutrition emerged, and 
reluctant to lower the price of food, officials opened feeding camps where the 
“old and destitute were kept behind barbed wire and fed twice a day on thin 
porridge” (Vaughan, 1985: 194; 1987: 43-6). Officials rejected calls for 
expanded free food relief because, in the words of one of them, “the whole thing 
would snowball and become a crippling financial liability in a very short time”, 
and would undermine the “African system of social security” (quoted by Iliffe, 
1984). Mandala concurs:  
 
‘Officials in Malawi lacked the resources or the will to mount 
meaningful relief programs … [T]he British in Malawi did not create 
a state upon which a hungry person could rely … [P]easants in 
Malawi conquered famine with their own resources’ (2005: 117). 
 
Drawing on her research on Nyasaland and limited secondary studies elsewhere 
in Africa before and after independence, Vaughan points to the limits to drought 
relief policies: “Nowhere in Africa, it seems, if you are starving can you be sure 
that relief will come your way …” (1987: 16). This was probably not true in 
either South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, at least from the 1910s, but may well 
have been true elsewhere. It certainly seems to have been true in Bechuanaland 
prior to the 1960s. The policy of the colonial governments seems to have been 
premised on the idea – prevalent across most of Africa – that ‘traditional’ social 
arrangements addressed poverty in rural areas. This meant leaving the redress of 
famine to the chiefs. Schapera recorded that “every member of a tribe … is 
entitled to … relief in case of destitution, famine or some other calamity”, and 
that it was “the duty of the chief and other tribal authorities … to assist [every 
man] with food whenever necessary” through distributing corn from his own 
granaries (1994 [1938]: 68-9, 123). The Protectorate did make provision for 
exceptional ‘destitutes’, through what was in effect poor relief (although, unlike 
in South Africa, there was no specific poor law).7 A colonial welfare officer was 
																																								 																				
7 In 1938-39, for example, £250 were allocated to destitutes in Bechuanaland, later 
supplemented with an additional £100. Most of the beneficiaries were ‘poor whites’, 
including a disabled white adolescent and her child, and some other poor white children who 
officials thought needed to be removed from ‘native reserves’. One documented beneficiary 
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appointed for the Protectorate in 1946, with a very meagre budget to deal with 
specifically urban indigence. This was part of an Empire-wide concern with 
‘social welfare’, understood at the time primarily in terms of social problems 
such as juvenile delinquency associated with urbanisation and ‘detribalisation’ 
(Lewis, 2000). The primary achievement of the Bechuanaland welfare officer 
was to organize boy scout and girl guide groups. Just prior to independence, the 
welfare officer began to promote ‘community development’, and assisted the 
formation of village development committees (Wass, 1972). The colonial 
administration emphasized the shift from ‘pure Welfare’ to ‘positive, 
constructive Community Development’, and the colonial department was 
renamed Community Development.8 In and when drought did result in severe 
need, beyond the capacity or will of chiefs to address, the colonial government 
seems to have largely ignored it (e.g. Rey, 1988: 129, 135). 
 
 
Emergency relief in Botswana, 1965-66 
 
The drought that hit Bechuanaland just prior to its achievement of independence 
(as Botswana) was exceptionally severe. The Protectorate had always been 
prone to drought, but the drought of the early 1960s was the worst since the 
previous century (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 32). Conditions had steadily 
worsened over almost a decade. In 1957, regional drought in the north-west and 
west had necessitated drought relief. Two years later, in 1959, drought affected 
most of the country. In 1960, “severe drought conditions prevailed over much of 
the territory”, resulting in “great mortality among livestock and low crop 
yields”. Severe and prolonged drought was experienced in 1961-62, continuing 
through 1963, 1964 and 1965 (Sandford, 1977: 24). Up to 1957, the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate has been self-sufficient in food, but from 1958 had to 
import maize, in growing volumes. As the drought persisted and deepened, the 
effects went beyond arable production to cattle mortality, as cattle starved or 
were pre-emptively culled in large numbers. Having remained stable up to 1964, 
the cattle population fell by almost one-third between 1964 and 1966 (Sandford, 
1977: 25). In April 1966, Seretse Khama told the new colonial parliament that 
this was “the worst drought in living memory, resulting from a succession of 
five years or more of very poor rains”.9 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
was a ‘native’ (called Chabe) who had been assaulted by two (white) South Africans, leaving 
him disabled (UK National Archives, DO 35/944/1). 
8 ‘Notes for Her Majesty’s opening address to 1964 administration conference’, Botswana 
National Archives, Social Welfare Development, Box 2 So.W 3. I am grateful to Sam Hamer 
for providing me with this information. 
9 Khama, Presidential Address to the 5th Annual Conference of the Bechuanaland Democratic 
Party, 9-10 April 1966, extracted in Carter and Morgan (1980). 
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The colonial administration began to get anxious about food in 1963. The 
budget for 1963/64 provided £14,000 for school feeding programmes. The 
British NGO Oxfam also granted about £10,000 for emergency seed subsidies 
and road-building. There was some discussion of a programme for the relief of 
destitutes, but it does not seem that it was effected. In 1964/65, the school 
feeding budget was increased to almost £25,000, with an additional £14,000 for 
mothers and pre-school age children. More than £23,000 was budgeted for 
emergency relief works.10  
 
Poor or no rains in early 1965 removed any prospect of any significant harvest 
that year; late rains (in April and May) helped somewhat with grazing for cattle, 
but were too late for crops. The deepening crisis posed an immediate challenge 
for the new colonial government, formed after elections in March 1965. The 
BDP, led by Seretse Khama, won the elections by a landslide, and BDP leaders 
formed a cabinet with Khama as Prime Minister, working with colonial officials 
under tight control from the Colonial Office in London. The new colonial 
government established a National Famine Relief Committee, which proposed 
various measures building on activities in previous years. In April. Oxfam’s 
Field Director C.M. Carruthers visited Bechuanaland, and reported that the 
various authorities had been slow to respond to early warnings of likely drought. 
He claimed that he himself had prompted the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Services to prepare a document on behalf of the 
National Famine Relief Committee, setting out the new government’s plans in 
response to the crisis. The document reportedly acknowledged that the drought 
had reached ‘disastrous proportions’, and an ‘effective response’ was beyond the 
resources of the colony and therefore depended on external assistance. The 
document proposed a mix of employment-creation and feeding programmes 
(including focused programmes for nursing mothers, young children and school 
children, as well as general free food distribution), and increased budget for the 
relief of ‘destitutes’ (especially the destitute elderly). Carruthers reported that 
the Cabinet accepted most of the proposals, with one modification: Whereas the 
NFRC had proposed that local committees dispense emergency relief in the 
form of cash, the BDP ministers in the Cabinet decided that they should only 
dispense relief in kind.11 
 
The Cabinet was in a difficult position, for at least four reasons. Firstly, 
information on the scale of the crisis in remoter parts of Botswana slowly 
reached the civil servants, who were in the process of moving from Mafeking 
(over the border in South Africa) to the new capital of Gaborone. In April it 
appeared that food would be needed for 20,000 ‘destitute persons’ (out of a total 
																																								 																				
10 Hand-written note, signed by A.C.Howard [of the Colonial Office, London], 24 March 
[1965], document 4 in file Colonial Office (CO) 1048/838 (UK National Archives). 
11 CO 1048/838. 
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population of about 600,000). By May, this figure had tripled to 60,000, and it 
was thought that it might rise to 90,000. Secondly, the Colonial Office in 
London continued to control the purse strings, and had to approve any 
unbudgeted expenditures – which it was slow to do. Thirdly, even when 
expenditures were approved, the fact that the drought affected South Africa also 
meant that it was becoming more and more difficult to buy the necessary food 
locally. Finally, even when the food arrived in Bechuanaland, there were 
insufficient trucks to transport it to the parts of the country where it was 
needed.12 
 
In the course of April and May a plan took shape. Lacking authorisation from 
the Colonial Office to spend beyond its approved budget, the Bechuanaland 
government established a National Relief Fund to raise funds from the public, 
and negotiated with Oxfam to spend the unspent balance of the 1964 relief grant 
on public works programmes, with the goal of getting money to poor families as 
much as building roads and dams. The National Relief Fund was expected to 
raise £10,000 (i.e. R20,000) and the balance on the Oxfam grant was reported to 
be R40,000. Most importantly, initial contact with the WFP raised the prospect 
of large-scale food aid.13 
 
The WFP had been formed only a few years before, in 1961. For years America 
had produced more food than it consumed, and American farmers successfully 
lobbied the federal government to purchase food stocks at high prices for 
distribution or sale elsewhere. Through the 1950s the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) – a UN agency – pushed for food surpluses to be used for 
developmental purposes as well as emergency relief in poor countries. US 
President Eisenhower established and his successor President Kennedy 
expanded the distribution of food to the poor in the USA and elsewhere under 
‘Public Law 480’, which was later called the ‘Food for Peace’ programme. In 
1961, the Kennedy administration and FAO agreed to establish a new 
multilateral emergency food aid programme, the WFP, initially as a three-year 
experiment (for 1963-65).  
 
In both Bechuanaland and London, poorly-informed officials initially thought 
that they could access American surplus food directly from the USA, under the 
Food for Peace programme. They soon turned their attention to the WFP as a 
conduit for food aid from the USA. In late April they applied to the WFP for 
emergency food relief. The WFP sent an official to assess the situation, and on 
his recommendation the WFP approved in late May a plan to source food from 
the USA for 20,000 people (under Emergency Operation 824). Rations would 
																																								 																				
12 ‘Information Note’, on Cabinet meetings on 7 April and 7 May 1965 (CO 1048/838). 
13 Ibid. 
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comprise yellow maize meal, skimmed milk powder and vegetable oil. The 
WFP budgeted $418,000 (equivalent to £150,000) for the operation.14 The food 
would be dispensed within Bechuanaland through District Commissioners and 
local relief committees. At this time, the Cabinet noted, “no special plans exist 
for the feeding of school children or mothers and babies”, presumably because 
neither food nor funds were available.15 When it became clear, in early May, 
that the number of ‘destitutes’ requiring food was much higher than 20,000, the 
Bechuanaland government – through the British government – requested the 
WFP to provide more food, for 60,000 people. Soon after, the WFP was asked 
also for 10,000 tons of maize for cattle feed.16 
 
The WFP food was not expected to arrive until July. In the meantime, the 
Colonial Office approved a paltry additional £1,000 for interim purchases, but 
the Batswana would have to rely primarily on their own fund-raising (through 
the National Relief Fund). Strikes in American ports were delaying food 
shipments. The Minister for Labour and Social Services reported to the Cabinet 
that the WFP food would not arrive until September.17 The WFP and Zambian 
government agreed that 143 tons of WFP maize en route to Zambia could be 
diverted to Botswana, whose need was more immediate. The Minister reported 
that approximately 13-14,000 Batswana were being fed and, contrary to 
sensational press reports, children were not dying of hunger. But, he insisted, 
“there is no room for complacency” given that “the full impact of famine [will] 
only reveal itself around August/September”.18 The WFP also agreed to pay for 
500 tons of maize to be purchased in South Africa to meet immediate needs. The 
Colonial Office was, however, shocked out of its complacency: the Secretary of 
State approved expenditure of R70,000 (£35,000) per month from August until 
the arrival of WFP food supplies, for the purchase of food through commercial 
channels, as well as £70,000 for drilling new boreholes and £30,000 for labour-
intensive development projects (to be funded out of the colony’s allocation from 
Colonial Development and Welfare funds). Oxfam also approved £5,000 for 
boreholes and £30,000 for subsidised sorghum seed supplies and the 
construction of dams, in addition to unspent funds from the previous grant.19 
 
Through August and September the NFRC coordinated food supplies on an ad 
hoc basis, scrabbling to ensure adequate supplies for the coming weeks without 
																																								 																				
14 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the [WFP] Executive Director’, Agenda Item 5 for the 
8th Session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 11-15 October 1965 (WFP/IGC 
8/5, dated 12 August 1965). 
15 ‘Information Note’ on Cabinet meeting of 7 May 1965 (CO 1048/838). 
16 Ibid. 
17 ‘Information Note’ on Cabinet meeting, 15 July 1965 (CO 1048/838). 
18 Ibid. 
19 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the Executive Director’ (12 August 1965). 
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succeeding in denting the anticipated shortfall over the following months. 
Besides the 143 tons of WFP maize diverted from Zambia, 500 tons had been 
purchased in South Africa by the WFP and 615 tons by the Bechuanaland 
government (with the funds approved by the Colonial Office). Even without 
much food to distribute, distribution was impaired by a shortage of transport. By 
the end of August, the National Relief Fund had spent almost all of the R37,000 
it had raised, on maize and trucks to deliver it. The WFP approved the request 
for cattle feed, but it would not arrive until October. The WFP refused to 
purchase cattle feed in South Africa in the meantime. The South African 
government did offer free cattle feed, but the Bechuanaland Cabinet declined the 
offer, suggesting instead that they borrowed cattle feed from South Africa and 
replace it when the WFP supplies arrived. The South Africans declined this 
proposal.20 
 
The Colonial Office in London received complaints from Bechuanaland that 
food was not being distributed in sufficient quantities to the poor. The British 
High Commissioner in Gaborone was compelled to defend himself:  
 
‘… not only have inexperienced Ministers recently taken on 
administrative functions for the first time, but they have also been 
confronted, by the drought, with a situation without precedent in this 
country. The first concern of my office has been to instil in Ministers a 
sense of urgency and responsibility in all questions concerned with the 
drought and its consequences, and in particular with famine relief. Our 
second concern has been to ensure that the machinery set up to deal 
with the problem is efficient. This has not been the easiest problem in 
the world, as it has necessarily involved the surrender by some 
Ministries of their prerogatives in certain fields to a co-ordinating 
committee. This group has now been functioning for some time, and 
has been completed only last week by the arrival of a World Food 
Programme expert in the supply and distributional problems of famine 
relief. His expertise was sorely lacking and will now be invaluable’.21  
 
Meanwhile, estimates of the number of destitute people needing food rose, first 
to 80,000, then to 100,000. In mid-September, the Bechuanaland government 
applied to the WFP for additional supplies of maize meal, dried milk and 
vegetable oil, to feed an additional 45,000 people (i.e. bringing the total to 
105,000 people) from November 1965 until February 1966. This was approved 
in early October. Of more immediate importance was the belated arrival, in 
October, of the long-awaited WFP supplies, by train through South Africa. 
																																								 																				
20 CO 1048/839. 
21 Hugh Norman-Walker, to Archie Campbell (CO), 18th August 1965 (CO 1048/839, 
document 154). 
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Oxfam and a second charitable NGO, War on Want, provided additional lorries 
for the distribution of the food. Over the following months, every time a 
shipload of food arrived in Port Elizabeth, the news was immediately sent to 
Bechuanaland and London. Famine was averted shipload by shipload, week by 
week. In December, the WFP approved a fourth expansion of their Emergency 
Operation. 
 
At the end of 1965 the High Commissioner sent London a report on the 
worsening drought situation. Rains had failed in most parts of the country in the 
final months of 1965. There would be little or no harvest in 1966, and the need 
for food relief would continue until mid-1967. He warned that the number of 
destitutes requiring food was currently 100,000, but could rise to as many as 
360,000 by July 1966. More than one quarter of the cattle herd had died. The 
cattle feed situation was bad, despite the Colonial Office’s approval of further 
expenditures. The priority must be to preserve a breeding herd. He concluded his 
covering letter, “One cannot but feel that Bechuanaland has deserved a better 
beginning to its independent future than providence has seen fit to order”.22  
 
Most food was being provided through the WFP, but the programme approved 
in June and expanded in October provided for supplies only until the end of 
February 1966. In late 1965, therefore, the Bechuanaland government made a 
further application to the WFP to continue food supplies from March. Poor rains 
were likely to lead to a poor harvest, at best. Moreover, South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia also experienced poor harvests. The government of Southern 
Rhodesia banned maize exports whilst South Africa might follow suit. The 
Bechuanaland government therefore requested that the existing emergency 
feeding programme be extended for a further four months, to the end of June, 
and expanded to provide for 360,000 people, i.e. more than half of the 
population. The situation with stockfeed was a little better, because the British 
Government had authorised expenditure of £50,000 on stockfeed.23 The WFP 
approved the application for food to the end of June. In a press release it was 
announced that the food would be distributed through food-for-work 
programmes and not for free.24 There was some doubt, however, as to where the 
WFP would source the maize. In late January the WFP informed the UK and 
Bechuanaland governments that they would in fact be unable to supply the 
promised quantities of food or stock feed because of strikes at US ports and a 
lack of cash to purchase supplies on the open market (at a cost of at least $1.8 
million plus shipping). The WFP encouraged the British to purchase food 
																																								 																				
22 Norman-Walker to Campbell (CO), 22nd Dec 1965 (CO 1048/840). 
23 CO 1048/840. 
24 Bechuanaland Daily News, 18 Jan 1966. 
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locally.25 The British approached the US State Department over these supposed 
delivery problems. It transpired that the problem was not delivery, as reported, 
but accessing supplies at very short notice. The British Government recognised 
that it would need to buy supplies – probably in South Africa – until the WFP 
succeeded in delivering grain.26 
 
The deepening food shortages and bad news from the WFP caused consternation 
in Gaberone and London. In early February, the Bechuanaland government sent 
the Colonial Office a detailed document on ‘Proposed Famine and Drought 
Relief and Rehabilitation Measures’. It reported that total financial commitments 
to date came to more than £1.6 million. Just over one half of this comprised the 
value of food aid supplied or committed by the WFP for the period ending at the 
end of the month (£828,000). The British government had provided £348,000 in 
additional grant-in-aid (i.e. budgetary support for the Bechuanaland 
government), £220,000 for boreholes (from the Colonial Development and 
Welfare budget) and an additional £95,000 for cattle feed for early 1966. The 
National Relief Fund had raised and spent £20,000 whilst Oxfam and other 
charities had spent £55,000. The new National Development Bank in 
Bechuanaland had committed £43,000 in loans for ploughing and borehole 
equipment. Looking forward, the document listed ‘immediate relief measures’ 
(including a supplementary feeding scheme for preschool and school-going 
children and nursing mothers) and ‘rehabilitation measures’, each requiring 
about £1.3 million, i.e. a total that was substantially larger than the total value of 
drought-related expenditures to date. The document warned that an additional £1 
million would be required if the WFP did not approve further human food, and 
an additional £200,000 if the WFP did not approve further stockfeed.27 
 
These prospective costs were enormous. In late February, officials from the 
Colonial Office and the new Ministry of Overseas Development met in London 
with the British High Commissioner (Norman-Walker), the Deputy Prime 
Minister (Quett Masire) and officials from the in the Bechuanaland government, 
together with personnel from various NGOs (including Oxfam, War on Want, 
Freedom From Hunger, the Red Cross and volunteer organisations). When the 
High Commissioner tabled his list of ‘immediate relief measures’ and 
‘rehabilitation measures’ – costing £2.6 million (a small part of which could be 
																																								 																				
25 Letter, misdated 24 Jan 1965 [but should be 1966] (CO 1048/838, document #E(i)33); see 
also ‘Terminal Report: Botswana 340’ (WFP/IGC 13/7 Add.36, 11th April 1968), Agenda 
Item 7, 13th session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 17-24 April 1968. 
26 Letter, A. Campbell (Colonial Office) to C.M. LeQuesne (Foreign Office), 11 Feb 1966; 
cypher, FO to Washington, 15 Feb 1966; cypher, Washington to FO, 7 March 1966 (FO 
371/188129). 
27 ‘Proposed Famine and Drought Relief and Rehabilitation Measures’, dated 10th February 
1966 (CO 1048/938 document 43). 
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funded out of existing budget commitments) – the UK government officials said 
that they could not provide any funding beyond the allocation already budgeted 
for 1966-67. The NGOs all pleaded poverty.28 
 
The High Commissioner’s request for the continuation of human feeding and the 
expansion of stock feeding posed considerable financial ‘difficulties’ for the 
CO. The number of destitutes was predicted to rise to 360,000 by mid-1966, and 
to stay at that level until well into 1967. This would cost £252,000, mostly for 
the distribution (with the WFP covering the cost of maize itself). As many as 
200,000 cattle would need feeding, at a cost of £664,000 in 1966/67. Limited 
provision for human and stock feeding (£175,000) had been made in the 
1966/67 grant-in-aid (or block grant). Even taking into account the proceeds of 
sales of cattle feed, a shortfall of about £573,000 remained. In addition, if the 
WFP did not come to the table again, an additional sum – variously estimated at 
between £219,000 and £300,000 – would be needed to purchase human food, 
making a likely total shortfall of between £792,000 and £873,000 for the year. 
The CO concurred that it was not realistic to fund more than the budgeted 
£175,000 out of either the grant-in-aid (£2.25 million) or the Colonial 
Development and Welfare allocation (£1.3m) provided by the UK to the 
Protectorate. Nor was it realistic to divert anything from the Protectorate’s 
domestic revenues (of about £2.5 million). The British Treasury refused to 
increase the grant-in-aid budget allocation. The CO pushed the new Overseas 
Development Ministry to find some money in their contingency reserves, and in 
April 1966 seem to have succeeded.29 
 
The British Government was helping to finance drought relief operation, but the 
financial burden was mostly shouldered by the WFP. The CO’s estimate of the 
cost of the WFP commitment was, in fact, too low. The WFP had initially 
committed a modest $418,600 (i.e. £150,000) for its Emergency Operation 
824.30 The number of people supported grew from 20,000 to 105,000, and 
extended also to cattle. By the time the operation was ended, in mid-1966, the 
WFP had spent about $3.5 million (i.e. £1.25 million), more than eight times the 
initial budget , providing 15,400 tons of maize or maize meal, about 1,500 tons 
of dried milk, almost 1000 tons of vegetable oil and 126 tons of dried fruit.31 
																																								 																				
28 ‘Note of a Meeting held at the Colonial Office on Wednesday, 23rd February, 1966’ (CO 
1048/938).. 
29 CO 1048/938. 
30 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the Executive Director’ (WFP/IGC 8/5, 12th August 
1965), Agenda Item 5 for the 8th Session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 
11-15 October 1965. 
31 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the Executive Director’ (WFP/IGC 11/6, 11th April 
1967), Agenda Item 6 for the 11th Session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 
12-21 April 1967. The WFP also approved (in early 1966) but did not need to implement two 
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Moreover, the WFP approved in April 1966 three new applications for funding 
from the Bechuanaland government, for massive food-for-work and school 
feeding programmes, together with a cattle feed programme, as we shall see 
below. It is difficult to believe that the slow-moving and relatively parsimonious 
British Government would have been willing to allocate to Bechuanaland / 
Botswana resources on the scale of the WFP. The drought relief operation thus 
reflected the shifting global political and institutional context. 
 
 
The shift to developmental programmes 
 
Speaking at the annual conference of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (as the 
BDP was called prior to independence), in April 1966, the Prime Minister 
(Seretse Khama) spoke at length about what he called “the worst drought in 
living memory, resulting from a succession of five years or more of very poor 
rains”. The government’s ‘first duty’, he said, had been “to save the poorer 
sections of the population from starvation”. Free feed also had to be provided for 
cattle, for the first time, “to save the national herd from extinction”. The 
government had appealed to international agencies (especially the WFP), foreign 
governments and NGOs (including Oxfam). “Food was provided initially for 
about 65,000 destitutes”, Khama told the BDP conference; “This number has 
since risen to 114,000, and we anticipate that well over half the population of 
Bechuanaland will need to be fed before the next rainy season” (i.e. in late 1966 
and early 1967).32 
 
During 1965-66, the government was preoccupied with distributing food, 
initially secured on an ad hoc basis but increasingly provided through the WFP. 
Initial low estimates of the need for food were repeatedly revised upwards, 
including for longer duration. In early 1966 it became apparent that the failure of 
the 1965-66 rains meant that the famine would deepen and extend beyond the 
WFP’s emergency operation, despite its extension to the end of June 1966. The 
government and the WFP were confronted with the challenge of how to sustain 
the relief operation. For its part, the WFP was required to prioritise 
developmental programmes, not simply emergency relief. Developmental 
programmes could include food-for-work programmes (working on agricultural 
or infrastructural projects), land settlement, special feeding programmes (to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
further extensions to Emergency Operation 824 to ensure that there was no shortfall in food 
supplies before supplies arrived under the replacement ‘development’ progammes. 
32 Khama, Presidential Address to the 5th Annual Conference of the Bechuanaland Democratic 
Party, 9-10 April 1966; see also ‘Information Note’ on Cabinet meeting 14 April 1966 (CO 
1048/939).  
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improve nutrition and school performance), and livestock feeding. This meshed 
with the preferences of the BDP leadership.  
 
As early as April 1966, Khama – still only Prime Minister – told his party that 
“The supply of free food for human consumption cannot, however, go on 
indefinitely, and plans are already being worked out throughout the economy for 
a new basis of distribution”.33 Discussions between the government and the 
WFP had already led (in March) to three new requests for aid being submitted to 
the WFP. The first request, for ‘Community Development and Tsetse Fly 
Control’, was for $5.9 million (more than £2 million), to cover the lion’s share 
of the total cost of just under $7.2 million of a food-for-work programme in 
urban and rural areas. Workers would construct housing and roads, and improve 
agricultural opportunities through destumping and clearance, soil and water 
conservation, and the control of tsetse flies. The initial application was for one 
year, but the project would be reviewed and could be extended for a further two 
years.34 “When completed, these schemes will have reinforced the traditional 
sense of self-reliance which is now disappearing”, the government wrote. A total 
of 60,000 ‘volunteers’ would be given sufficient food for their households, so 
that the programme would benefit an estimated total of 360,000 people, i.e. way 
over half of the population.35 The second request was for almost $5.5 million 
(almost £2 million), to cover almost all of the total cost (of almost $5.8 million) 
of a “supplementary feeding programme for school-children, mothers and pre-
school children” for five years. This would cover 72,000 school children (during 
school terms), and 44,000 pregnant and nursing mothers attending clinics and 
63,000 pre-school children through clinics (year-round).36 Thirdly, the 
government requested $1.2 million (£430,000) to cover one half of the total cost 
(of $2.4 million) of a ‘Livestock feeding scheme’, to feed the national breeding 
herd from July to November 1966.37  
 
																																								 																				
33 Khama, Presidential Address to BDP, 1966. 
34 The very small tsetse fly control programme extended beyond one year, to three years. 
‘Projects for IGC approval: Summary of official request, Bechuanaland, Community 
Development and Tsetse Fly Control’ (WFP/IGC 9/10 Add.17, dated 22nd March 1966), 
Agenda item no.9, 9th session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 18-26 April 
1966. 
35 ‘Community Development and Tsetse Fly Control: Summary of official request’ 
(WFP/IGC 9/10 Add.17, 22nd March 1966), Agenda item no.9, 9th session of the WFP 
Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 18-26 April 1966.  
36 ‘Supplementary feeding programme for school-children, mothers and pre-school children: 
Summary of official request’ (WFP/IGC 9/10 Add.18, 22nd March 1966), Agenda item no.9, 
9th session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 18-26 April 1966. 
37 ‘Livestock feeding scheme: Summary of official request’ (WFP/IGC 9/10 Add.19, 22nd 
March 1966), Agenda item no.9, 9th session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, 
Rome, 18-26 April 1966. 
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In April 1966, the Deputy Prime Minister (Masire), together with the Financial 
Secretary (Alf Beeby) and the Officer in charge of famine relief (Heady) 
travelled to Rome to address the WFP. Previous requests to the WFP had been 
routed through the British Government. The WFP approved all three requests.38 
These were huge grants, totalling almost $14 million (£5 million), with one of 
the three programmes extending over five years. The British Government 
continued to provide necessary financial support also, including almost $1 
million to cover costs of transport, storage facilities and additional staff. It also 
paid for the purchase of stock feed when the arrival of WFP stock feed was 
delayed by strikes at American ports, as well as one half of the stock feed 
needed thereafter. The UK government’s general budgetary support for the new 
Government of Botswana also enabled the latter to contribute to the costs of 
administering and distributing food aid.39 Notwithstanding this, the support from 
the WFP did reduce the dependence of the Government of Botswana on Britain.  
 
The new programmes were first piloted before being rolled out across the 
Protectorate as a whole. The school feeding programme was, according to 
Masire, based on one that Masire himself had developed in Kanye, when he had 
been school principal (Masire, 2006: 79-80). The NGOs Save the Children and 
Red Cross had also funded an experimental pre-school feeding programme in 
May and June.40 Under the new WFP programme, primary school children were 
provided with a mid-morning meal comprising blended food and vegetable oil 
(Stevens, 1979: 90). A family receiving two ‘rations’ (for example, for the 
mother and preschool child) would receive benefits worth R38 per annum, 
whilst a family receiving three (perhaps for an additional primary school child) 
would receive R48. These were significant additions to the welfare of poor 
households (Stevens, 1978: 26-7). The new food-for-work programme was also 
piloted, beginning in May, under the supervision of the Community 
Development Officer.41 Indeed, the initiative may have originated with the 
Community Development Officer (Wass, 1972). 
 
																																								 																				
38 Bechuanaland Daily News, 25 April 1966. The food-for-work programme was WFP 
programme no. 323, the supplementary feeding programme was WFP programme no. 324 and 
the livestock feeding programme was WFP programme no. 340. 
39 ‘Interim Appraisal Report: Botswana 323’ (WFP/IGC 12/6 Add. 69, 29th September 1967), 
Agenda Item 6, 12th session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 5-14 October 
1967. The CO budgeted a total of £1.1 million for drought relief for the 1966-67 financial 
year. 
40 CO 1048/939, document 168. The WFP nonetheless later asserted that ‘Before WFP food 
aid was provided for primary school feeding in 1966 there was no school feeding programme 
in the country’ (WFP, ‘Interim Evaliation Report: Botswana 324; WFP/IGC 19/9 Add.28, 23 
February 1971; Agenda Item no.9 for the 19th session of the IGC, Rome, 29 March – 7 April 
1971). 
41 CO 1048/939. 
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The food-for-work programme seems to have been the priority for the BDP 
government. In Khama’s account, in April, the ‘new system’ for providing food 
would entail “continuing to give free supplies to all such as are incapable of 
earning their keep on account of illness, old age, blindness or any other form of 
physical incapacity”, but shifting to food-for-work programmes for able-bodied 
men of working age. The government was already “drawing up plans for work 
projects throughout the country, such as the building of roads, construction of 
dams, making bricks for the erection of classrooms and quarters for teachers …” 
The government was also purchasing tractors and ploughs to help farmers 
prepare the land in the absence of cattle for ploughing.42 In July, the food-for-
work programme formally began, providing ‘able-bodied destitutes’ who 
worked on the programme with sufficient maize and dried fruit to feed six 
people. “There are no rations for those who refuse to work”, declared the 
government. Projects would include building classrooms and teachers’ houses.43 
At some point in 1966-67 the food-for-work programme was given a formal 
name by the Government of Botswana: Ipelegeng, meaning self-help.44 
 
The food-for-work programme was rushed into operation. District 
commissioners identified projects after discussions with local chiefs, headmen 
and councillors. For the first couple of months, priority was given to projects 
that required little planning or organisation, such as village cleaning, road 
repairs and mud brick making. By September 1966 projects were more carefully 
selected. The new projects included dam and water conservation schemes, 
school-building and making ‘burnt’ bricks. The WFP gushingly reported that 
this “stimulated the enthusiasm of the people”.45 Stevens (1979: 111) later 
reported that much of the work done had been of low standard, partly because 
the programme attracted people “with a low work capacity”, partly because of 
inadequate supervision and equipment. 
 
Food-for-work programmes and feeding programmes formed the core of the 
Botswana government’s response to drought – and thus, in practice, poverty – 
from 1966 onwards. They did leave a small gap, with “destitutes incapable of 
taking part in ‘food for work’ projects” being “provided for by other means”.46 It 
is unclear what numbers of people were provided for through these various 
																																								 																				
42 Khama, Presidential Address to BDP, 1966. 
43 Press release, Bechuanaland Protectorate Government (dated 27 July) (CO 1048/939). 
44 ‘Interim Appraisal Report: Botswana 323’ (WFP/IGC 12/6 Add. 69, 29th September 1967), 
Agenda Item 6, 12th session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 5-14 October 
1967.  
45 ‘Interim Appraisal Report: Botswana 323’ (WFP/IGC 12/6 Add. 69, 29th September 1967), 
Agenda Item 6, 12th session of the WFP IGC, Rome, 5-14 October 1967.  
46 Bechuanaland Protectorate Government, according to Telegram, High Commissioner to 
Colonial Office, 13 June 1966 (CO 1048/939, document 174). 
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programmes. The food-for-work programmes and feeding programmes reached 
a large proportion of the population through the second half of 1966 and into 
early 1967. The WFP-funded food-for-work programme (#323) was intended to 
reach 360,000 people – more than half of the population – through 60,000 
workers. In practice, it reached about half of this number. The WFP-funded 
feeding programme (#324) also grew slowly. Nonetheless, these figures suggest 
that approximately one-third of the population was fed through drought relief 
during 1966-67. 
 
 
The institutionalisation of relief programmes 
 
Employment on the food-for-work programme (WFP programme no. 323) never 
reached the target of 60,000. The maximum number of ‘volunteers’ at any one 
time had been about 34,000. Over the first six months of the project the average 
was just over 30,000, giving an estimated total of over 180,000 beneficiaries, or 
close to one-third of the population. Good rains in early 1967 meant that the 
demand for food and work dropped. In July 1967, the programme provided work 
and food for only 13,000 workers. In August, the number dropped to 7,400, and 
in September to 5,900, ‘as many workers left voluntarily to reap the good 
harvests’. The programme was shut down after 15 months in September 1967. 
Only 19,000 tons of food (just under one half of the approved amount) were 
distributed, at a total cost to the WFP of only $2.5 million (i.e. less than half of 
the $5.9 million that had been committed).47 The cattle feed programme had 
already been terminated, early, in July 1967, after only one-third of the 
committed feed had been supplied.48  
 
The children feeding programme, however, expanded steadily after a slow start. 
After two years it had reached only 32,000 primary school children (compared 
to the target of 72,000) and 11,000 pre-school children (compared to the target 
of 63,000).49 The number of primary school children fed grew from 32,000 to 
80,000 in early and mid-1968, passing the target of 72,000, and prompting the 
Government to apply to the WFP to raise the target to 92,000. The number of 
preschool children (and mothers) fed tripled in early 1968, to about 30,000, and 
the Government confidently predicted that the combined target of 107,000 
																																								 																				
47 ‘Terminal Report: Botswana 323’ (WFP/IGC 13/7 Add.35, 11th April 1968), Agenda Item 
7, 13th session of the WFP IGC, Rome, 17-24 April 1968. See also Botswana (1968): 63. 
48 ‘Terminal Report: Botswana 340’ (WFP/IGC 13/7 Add.36, 11th April 1968), Agenda Item 
7, 13th session of the WFP IGC, Rome, 17-24 April 1968.  
49 ‘Summary of revised official request: Botswana 324 (third revision)’ (WFP/IGC 14/9 
Add.8), Agenda item no. 9, 14th Session of the IGC, 6-15 November 1968; ‘Project for IGC 
approval: Botswana 324 Exp.’ (WFP/IGC 19/6 Add.9, 10 February 1971), Agenda Item no.6, 
19th Session of the IGC, 29 March – 7 April 1971. 
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would be met before the end of the first five years of the programme in 1971. 
The rations were increased, school feeding was extended to more days per 
annum, and the programme was extended to cover TB outpatients. These 
revisions increased to budget for the five-year programme by $1 million, to a 
total of $6.5 million.50 
 
In practice, the food-for-work as well as the children feeding programmes 
continued and became institutionalised. In its initial application to the WFP for 
the food-for-work programme, the Bechuanaland Government had declared its 
hope that the development schemes would continue, albeit on a smaller scale 
and a ‘self-help basis’, even after the need for food aid ended.51 It is not clear 
what did continue following the termination of WFP Programme 323 in late 
1967, but only a few months later the Government applied to the WFP for a new 
‘emergency operation’. The improved rains in 1966-67 were not repeated in 
1967-68. Cereal production was to remain low or very low until 1971, with food 
aid continuing to exceed local production (Cathie, 1991). In March 1968 the 
WFP approved the request to resume its food-for-aid programme in Botswana. 
The WFP’s Emergency Operation 861 provided food-for-work for 10,000 
workers, supporting a total of 60,000 people, for the ten months from April 1968 
through February 1969, at a total cost of just under $1 million. This was later 
extended for an additional three months, and then one further month, at an 
additional cost of almost $400,000. Like the previous food-for-work 
programme, this entailed providing WFP food to work gangs moulding bricks 
and using these to build classrooms, houses for teachers and other officials. It 
also supplied food to Angolan refugees in north-west Botswana whilst they built 
houses and cleared fields.52 The third WFP food-for-work programme (#564) 
followed immediately on from the second, in July 1969. Initially intended to last 
for just over one year, to August 1970, it was extended to May 1971. For most 
of the first year the programme employed about 20,000 workers, each 
supposedly supporting another five dependents. In the second year it was scaled 
down to about 10,000 workers.53 
 
																																								 																				
50 ‘Summary of Revision Official Request: Botswana 324 revision’ (WFP/IGC 10/2 Add.9, 
8th October 1966), Agenda Item 11, 10th session of the WFP IGC, Rome, 31 Oct-9 Nov 1966.  
51 ‘Community Development and Tsetse Fly Control: Summary of official request’ 
(WFP/IGC 9/10 Add.17, 22nd March 1966), Agenda item no.9, 9th session of the WFP IGC, 
Rome, 18-26 April 1966.  
52 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the Executive Director’ (WFP/IGC 14/5 6 November 
1968), Agenda item no, 5(a), 14th Session of the IGC, Rome, 11-16 November 1968; see also 
Stevens (1979): 104-5. 
53 ‘Terminal Report: 564Q, Community Development in Drought-Stricken Areas’ (WFP/IGC 
26/11 Add.B5, August 1974), Agenda Item no. 11, 26th Session of the IGC, Rome, 24-30 
October 1974.  
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Food production in Botswana improved from 1971 (Cathie, 1991), but there 
continued to be localised droughts. These included slight problems across most 
of the country in 1971 and 1973, and regional difficulties in the east in 1970/71, 
Ngamiland (in the north-west) in 1970, 1972/73, and perhaps Tsabong (in the 
south-west) in 1974 (Sandford, 1977: 28, B20-21). In May 1973, in the 
aftermath of poor rains, the Government applied again to the WFP for a fourth 
food-for-work programme. The WFP approved Emergency Operation 995 for 
six months, for 50,000 beneficiaries, at a cost to WFP of $350,000.54 Work was 
limited to brick-making and field-clearing, ‘in the belief that government 
technical supervision would be adequate for these tasks’. Despite the by-now 
extensive experience in running food-for-work programmes, this campaign also 
ran into organisational difficulties: 
 
‘First, more people reported for work than had been anticipated. Each 
village was set a quota when the project was planned, but in almost all 
cases these were exceeded during the first half of the project period. 
This was partly owing to bad luck: estimating the number of people 
made destitute by drought is a hazardous affair, and the forecasts can 
be little more than “guesstimates”. However, the excess turnout was 
also partly due to the government’s own actions. When the project 
was planned, destitute families were categorised as: 
 
• Class A – households with no visible means of support but able to 
provide an ablebodied worker aged 14-60 years; 
• Class B – households with similar characteristics to Class A, but 
owning five or less small stock 
• Class C – households qualifying for admission to Classes A and B 
but unable to supply an able-bodied worker aged 14-60 years. 
 
The WFP assisted food for work project was designed to help Classes 
A and B who were assumed to be temporarily destitute as a result of 
the drought. It was not intended that Class C should be included for 
obvious reasons: destitute families with no able-bodied workers are 
unlikely to be able to participate in a programme of physical labour, 
and their destitution is unlikely to be a temporary consequence of the 
drought. In the event, however, no such programme materialised, and 
Class C destitutes tended to join the food for work projects’ (Stevens, 
1979: 111-2). 
 
																																								 																				
54 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the Executive Director’ (WFP/IGC 26/5-B, September 
1974), Agenda Item 5 for the 26th Session of the WFP IGC, Rome, 11-15 October 1965. 
	
	
	 24 
The campaign was ended when rains improved in late 1973 and into 1974, and 
participants left to plough their lands. Stevens assesses that “it would have been 
cheaper for the government to have handed out the food aid free of charge than 
it was to make people work for it” – although the programme might have 
succeeded in its goal of safeguarding the dignity of the destitute (Stevens, 1979: 
112-3, 120-1). 
 
Parts of the state sought to continue public employment programmes even after 
the threat of immediate drought had passed and WFP food supplies had come to 
an end. In 1974 the Department of Labour lobbied unsuccessfully for funds to 
continue to pay cash (rather than food) to the 10,000 workers on the food-for-
work programme (Chambers, 1977: 2-3). The following year, however, 
following advice from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the 
government budgeted (through the fourth National Development Plan) more 
than 1 million Pula (i.e. more than 1 million Rand) for labour-intensive public 
works programmes for the three years 1978/79-1980/81 (see Botswana, 1975: 
326-7). It also bought trucks for the distribution of WFP food. Even before 
drought recurred in 1978/79, the state had institutionalised food-for-work 
programmes. 
 
By June 1970, the number of primary school children being fed rations (during 
school term) had reached 82,000, through 280 schools. Almost 50,000 pre-
school children and 25,000 expectant and nursing mothers were fed, along with 
about 4,000 secondary school students, Youth Brigade trainees, refugee children 
and TB patients, giving a total of 161,000 beneficiaries (or one quarter of the 
total population).55 
 
In 1971, following an evaluation, the WFP approved a five-year extension of the 
feeding programme, at a total cost to the WFP of almost $9 million (almost £4 
million). The number of schoolchildren to be fed was expected to rise to 94,000. 
The targets for the ‘vulnerable groups’ remained unchanged: 63,000 pre-school 
children, 9,000 pregnant women, 36,000 nursing mothers and 2,500 TB out-
patients.56 At the same time, the WFP provided food for secondary between 
9,000 and 14,000 secondary school students and Youth Brigade trainees under a 
separate programme.57 By 1975, the feeding programme reached about 110,000 
primary school students, in more than 300 schools, in addition to almost as 
many people in ‘vulnerable groups’, i.e. a total of almost one-third of the 
																																								 																				
55 WFP, ‘Interim Evaluation Report: Botswana 324’ (WFP/IGC 19/9 Add.28, 23 February 
1971; Agenda Item no.9 for the 19th session of the IGC, Rome, 29 March – 7 April 1971). 
56 ‘Feeding for Primary School Children and Vulnerable Groups: Project for IGC Approval’ 
(Botswana 324 EXP) (WFP/IGC 19/6, Add.9, 10th February 1971), Agenda Item no.6, 19th 
Session of the IGC, Rome, 29th March – 7th April 1971. 
57 Under WFP programme 610, ‘Institutional Feeding’. 
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population.58 In 1978 the WFP reported that the official statistics on the numbers 
of beneficiaries were suspect. According to these statistics, 143,000 primary 
school children, 102,000 pre-school children, 33,000 mothers and 4,000 TB 
patients benefitted. The actual numbers of regular beneficiaries was almost 
certainly lower than these.59 Nonetheless, the growth was clearly strong, and the 
WFP feeding programme was repeatedly extended. In 1979, the WFP 
anticipated that the anticipated numbers of school children supported would rise 
from 140,000 to 150,000 by 1982. The targets for other ‘vulnerable groups’ 
were set at 85,000 preschool children, 35,000 expectant and nursing mothers, 
and (over three years) 4,500 TB outpatients. More than 1,000 Youth Brigade 
trainees would also be fed, giving a total target of more than 270,000 
individuals. The cost to the WFP would be more than $22 million (about £11 
million).60 In the face of renewed drought, these targets were exceeded. By mid-
1983, 199,000 school children were receiving midday meals, with many 
children in rural areas receiving food also over weekends and school holidays, 
and there were more than 300,000 ‘vulnerable group beneficiaries’. In total, 
about 50 percent of the population was being fed by the WFP through this 
programme.61 The programme was later extended twice more.62  
 
The food-for-work programmes together with the school and ‘vulnerable 
groups’ feeding programme did not reach all poor people. Some ‘destitute’ 
households lacked able-bodied adults who could be employed on food-for-work 
programmes (i.e. fell into ‘Class C’ in the typology discussed above) but could 
not survive on whatever food they received through school or vulnerable group 
feeding programmes. Botswana inherited an ad hoc system of destitute relief, 
without any statutory poor law. Although a new policy was repeatedly envisaged 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, expenditures remained ad hoc and meagre. In 
1972, the total expenditure on ‘destitutes’ by all of the district councils came to 
less than R10,000 – which was the equivalent of less than 2 percent of the 
budget for feeding programmes for ‘vulnerable groups’ (Stevens, 1978: 28). The 
result was pressure on district councils and development committees to include 
																																								 																				
58 WFP, ‘Interim Evaluation Report: Botswana 324 and Exp.’ (WFP/IGC 28/11 Add.4, 
August 1975; Agenda Item no.11 for the 28th session of the IGC, Rome, 29 September – 3 
October 1975). 
59 WFP, ‘Interim Evaluation Report: Botswana 324 and Exp.’ (WFP/CFA 7/10 Add.4, March 
1979; Agenda Item no.10 for the 7th session of the IGC, Rome, 14-25 May 1979). 
60 ‘Feeding for Primary School Children and Vulnerable Groups: Project for CFA Approval’ 
(Botswana 324 EXP II) (WFP/CFA 7/12 (WPME) Add.5, March 1979), Agenda Item no.12, 
7th Session of the WFP Committee on Food and Policies and Programmes, Rome, 14-25 May 
1979. 
61 ‘Interim Evaluation Summary Report: Feeding for Primary School Children and Vulnerable 
Groups’ (Botswana 324 EXP II) (WFP/CFA 17/6 Add.A8, Feb 1984), Agenda Item no.16, 
17th Session of the CFA, Rome, 28 May – 8 June 1984. 
62 Under 324 EXP IIII (1984) and EXP IV (1990). 
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‘destitutes’ in food-for-work programmes (as we saw above) or find other 
money. In 1974 responsibility for poor relief was transferred to local 
government. The number of claimants was small compared to drought years, but 
was rising, without any corresponding increase in the resources available. At the 
same time as it requested funds to enable it to replace food rations with cash for 
10,000 workers on food-for-work programmes (see above), The Department of 
Local Government asked for money to provide food to 3,000 destitute families. 
Neither proposal was raised funded. The government appears to have prioritised 
more ‘visible’ projects: roads, and classrooms and other buildings (Chambers, 
1977: 2-3). 
 
Almost continuously for the six years from early 1965 to early 1971 (and then 
again in late 1973 into early 1974) somewhere between 10 and 30 percent of the 
population were being fed through emergency food aid (in 1965-66) or food-for-
work programmes (from 1966), mostly supplied by the WFP with substantial 
direct and indirect financial support from the British government. A study 
conducted in 1971/72 (with the assistance of the FAO) and published in 1974 
found that more than one in three households (presumably in affected areas) had 
been involved in food-for-work programmes at some time. Most participants 
were women, and most were poor (Stevens, 1979: 192), making it “one of the 
very few programmes in Botswana” to reach the poor (Colclough & McCarthy, 
1980: 133). In addition, the number of children (preschool and at school) and 
mothers being fed through feeding schemes rose steadily from about 43,000 in 
early 1968 to about 150,000 in the early 1970s, more than 200,000 by 1975, and 
about 250,000 individuals by the time that drought recurred in 1979 (after which 
the number rose rapidly). Throughout this period, in non-drought as well as 
drought years, a substantial proportion of the population was receiving WFP 
food. As Masire (2006: 79-80) recalled later, he “went to the World Food 
Programme to seek assistance, and as we faced periodic drought, it became an 
almost annual pilgrimage”. 
 
This massive operation required institutional reform. Initially, in 1965, 
implementation was done on an ad hoc basis, with District Commissioners 
liaising with chiefs and headmen. Legislation in 1965 transferred legislative and 
executive powers from chiefs to elected District Councils. Thereafter, District 
Commissioners worked with the new Councils and especially with more local 
Village Development Committees (Munemo, 2012: 139-41). The food-for-work 
and children feeding programmes initiated in 1966 were initially administered 
by the Food Supply Branch of the Ministry of Home Affairs, under a Senior 
Administrative Officer who was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. At 
the local level, food under the food-for-work programme was distributed by 
local government officials together with Village Development Committees 
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(requiring, the WFP was told, an additional 150 clerks),63 whilst the feeding 
programmes were run through schools and clinics.  
 
In June 1970, in the face of administrative weaknesses within the Food Supply 
Branch, the Government established a dedicated Special Feeding and Famine 
Relief Unit within the Department of Local Government, with a head who was 
directly responsible to the Permanent Secretary in the Department.64 For reasons 
that are unclear, the distribution of food was soon consolidated under a new 
Institutional Food Programme (IFP),65 which was to manage the distribution of 
WFP food until May 1982, when it was replaced by a new Department of Food 
Resources. The IFP handled more than 32,000 tons of WFP food between 1971 
and 1975 alone (Stevens, 1979: 41). 
 
 
Rethinking drought relief  
 
Although good rains in the mid-1970s removed much of the pressure for drought 
relief, both the Botswana government and its international partners were 
conscious of the need to improve systems of provision. In late 1976, with 
funding from the British Government, a consultant (Stephen Sandford) was 
flown to Botswana to write a report on Dealing with Drought. Sandford 
considered the problems posed by drought to both human and cattle populations. 
He warned that the authorities should anticipate that drought would recur 
regularly, and urged that plans be drawn up in advance. He wondered how much 
of the human problem entailed insufficient production, and how much involved 
“a permanently destitute class of people whom drought tips over the edge into 
near-famine conditions because of its effect on their incomes rather than on their 
food supply” (Sandford, 1977: 56). The appropriate response was therefore to 
smooth incomes, not to smooth consumption (through the distribution of food). 
He acknowledged a debate over whether future famine relief should entail food-
for-work or ‘free handouts’, but noted that organising public works programmes 
during droughts was difficult and that many poor (destitute) people (such as the 
elderly and women) might not be able to work for food (ibid: 60).  
 
																																								 																				
63 ‘Community Development and Tsetse Fly Control: Summary of official request’ 
(WFP/IGC 9/10 Add.17, 22nd March 1966), Agenda item no.9, 9th session of the WFP 
Intergovernmental Committee, Rome. 
64 ‘Feeding for Primary School Children and Vulnerable Groups: Project for IGC Approval’ 
(Botswana 324 EXP) (WFP/IGC 19/6, Add.9, 10th February 1971), Agenda Item no.6, 19th 
Session of the IGC, Rome, 29th March – 7th April 1971. 
65 ‘Emergency Operations: Report by the Executive Director’ (WFP/IGC 26/5-B, September 
1974), Agenda Item 5 for the 26th Session of the WFP Intergovernmental Committee, Rome, 
24-30 October 1974. 
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New research within Botswana was beginning to reveal the changing profile of 
poverty. Many men continued to work as migrant workers in South Africa. 
Whilst wages on South African mines rose significantly in the 1970s, and many 
migrants used the ‘voluntary deferred pay’ system to repatriate a portion of their 
earnings back to Botswana when they concluded their contracts, the resident 
working-age population in rural areas of Botswana was predominantly female 
and many households were in practice headed by women. At the same time, as 
research by Syson (1973) showed, marriage rates were falling and many – 
perhaps even most – young mothers were unmarried. Whilst many would marry 
later, many others would remain unmarried. Women-headed households 
generally owned fewer stock than male-headed households, and unmarried 
women tended to live in households that were less likely to plough land. 
Whereas most married women were supported primarily by their husbands, 
unmarried women depended on other kin. Almost one in six unmarried women 
depended primarily on WFP food rations (with a much smaller proportion 
pointing to the Ipelegeng food-for-work programme, which was in abeyance 
when most of the fieldwork was undertaken in 1971-72). Further research, some 
using data from subsequent national surveys, fuelled debate over the gendered 
character of poverty (Peters, 1983, 1984; Kerven, 1984; Izzard, 1985; see also 
Bruun, Mugabe & Coombes, 1994; O’Laughlin, 1998). 
 
Developments elsewhere in the world also influenced thinking within the WFP 
and hence, indirectly, policy reform in Botswana. In 1973-75 the Sahel was 
beset by acute famine following six successive years of drought. Seven countries 
were affected. A three-year emergency relief operation supplied a total of 2.5 
million tons of cereals to the region. Food, other basic supplies, and animal feed 
were delivered by one thousand trucks as well as in airlifts, airdrops and camel 
caravans into remote areas. Nonetheless, more than 100,000 people, and one 
million cattle, died. In 1973 drought beset Ethiopia also. In both cases, the WFP 
played a central role in monitoring and coordinating relief operations. The 
Ethiopian case provided a number of specific lessons: A National Drought 
Relief Committee was established early on. The emphasis of the operation 
switched from emergency relief to long-term rehabilitation, with food supplies 
increasingly being allocated to food-for-work programmes, for work including 
soil conservation, irrigation and reforestation projects. More generally, the 1973-
75 crises pointed to the importance of early-warning systems, pre-drought 
preparation and improved relief coordination  (Shaw, 2011: 54-6).66 
																																								 																				
66 Many lessons from food relief operations in Botswana, the Sahel (Upper Volta) and 
elsewhere (Tunisia and Lesotho) were distilled in an important book by another researcher 
based at the Overseas Development Institute (and also funded by the British Ministry of 
Overseas Development), Christopher Sevens (Stevens, 1979). 
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In Botswana, food-for-work programmes were already central to drought relief, 
there was already some national coordination, and there had already been a 
partial shift from relief to proactive development (as we have seen above). The 
government of Botswana was already paying close attention to production. The 
government continued the policy of the late colonial state of drilling boreholes 
to improve water supplies in rural areas (see Peters, 1994; Carlson, 2003). Water 
was not only a critical material resource, but was also symbolically important, a 
‘manifestation of the benign power of goromente (government)’ (Gulbrandsen, 
2012: 200). These policies helped to insure some cattle farmers – mostly the 
richer ones – against drought. Many BDP leaders and senior bureaucrats had 
become large farmers. Improved revenues due to the growth of mining output at 
Orapa and Selebi-Phikwe meant that the state could invest also in the 
modernisation of agriculture and diversification in rural development. In 1972, 
the government proclaimed its commitment to more broad-based rural 
development in a Government Paper (Botswana, 1972), commissioned 
consultants from the Institute for Development Studies in the UK (headed by 
Robert Chambers), and published a second Government Paper summarising the 
government’s response to their recommendations (Botswana, 1973a; see also 
Botswana, 1973b). Late in 1973, the government approved an Accelerated Rural 
Development Programme (ARDP), which it implemented (in haste) between 
1974 and 1976.  
 
It was not clear that the poor benefitted from these policy reforms. A growing 
proportion of households had no cattle (Saugestad, 2001: 78; see also Colclough 
& McCarthy, 1980). Chambers was critical in his evaluation of the ARDP in 
1976-77, arguing that infrastructure was only a beginning, and made little 
difference to the poor:  
 
‘The issue now is one of imagination and political will to direct policy 
and the civil service towards ensuring that economic growth means 
better lives not just for those rural people who are more able to help 
themselves but specifically for those who are poorer, weaker, and less 
capable of taking advantage of opportunities; for those in short who 
tend to get left behind and left out’ (Chambers, 1977: 36).  
 
In 1978 the government did initiate an Arable Land Development Programme 
(ALDEP) aimed at the 60-70,000 small farmers who ploughed less than 10 
hectares, many of whom had too few cattle to plough and lacked labour also. 
ALDEP would effectively subsidise farmers’ adoption of new productivity-
raising technologies, including donkey-ploughing and fencing, as well as 
through price stabilisation (Botswana, 1979, Part I: 6/26-6/31). Among the 
poorest people in Botswana were the San (‘Bushmen’). The government did 
initiate programmes aimed at the San: the Bushmen Development Programme 
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(1974-77), followed by the Remote Areas Development Programme, aimed at 
60,000 ‘remote rural poor’. Scholars were generally sceptical about the design 
and effects of these programmes (e.g. Saugestad, 2001: 117-9). 
 
The BDP government did invest heavily in education and health care. Financial 
support from several donors helped Botswana to extend its primary school 
system. Primary school fees were reduced, and Botswana achieved almost 
universal primary education. Investment was increasingly redirected to 
secondary schooling. Public health care had also been very limited in 1966: 
Botswana had “only eight small hospitals and perhaps two-dozen clinics and 
dispensaries” (Masire, 2006: 218). Slow improvements in public health services 
contributed to dramatic improvements in health outcomes. In 1973, the state 
began to emphasise primary health care clinics and posts, especially in rural 
areas (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 222-4).  
 
In the mid and late 1970s the BDP government seems to have been lulled into 
complacency about the challenges of deep poverty. Mining was booming, and 
growing the economy. The government was expanding rapidly public education 
and investing in improved nutrition through its feeding programmes, which 
together helped to improve the opportunities for many younger Batswana to take 
advantage of economic growth. Agricultural policies aimed to improve 
production and ward off the risks of famine and cattle mortality. Food-for-work 
programmes ensured some opportunities for the poor, and the school and 
vulnerable groups feeding programmes helped to meet their most basic need. 
Despite good rains, however, destitution did not disappear. More importantly, 
drought would at some point recur, pushing again many poor households back 
into severe destitution.  
 
In June 1978, in response to the Sandford Report, the government convened a 
symposium on drought (Hinchey, 1979). The Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning commissioned a Drought Contingency Plan. Another 
report recommended advance planning, in part to ensure that healthy cattle could 
be sold in large numbers as soon as drought appears likely. The report suggested 
that, given that the high costs of drought, the government should incur regular 
expenditure to limit these costs. A permanent coordinating National Drought 
Relief Committee was established to ensure more rapid responses in the event of 
drought (McGowan & Associates, 1979). But the government was slow to 
prepare for the inevitable drought. 
 
The rains due in late 1978 were disappointing. In January there were briefly 
good rains, but then no further rain. The result was that no crops were harvested 
in 1979 and the demand for labour collapsed in rural areas. The Government 
initially responded slowly, providing relief food far too late:  
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‘Government’s position seems to be that, at least to begin with, 
household response is likely to be adequate, and that for famine relief 
to be provided at this early stage would discourage some households 
from trying to help themselves, and so create a “welfare dependency”’ 
(Vierich & Sheppard, 1980: 68). 
 
Despite discussion, the country still had no contingency plan, and ‘was ill-
prepared to launch a nationwide relief programme’ (Gooch & Macdonald, 1981: 
14). Elections, scheduled for October 1979, intensified the need for the BDP 
government to respond effectively to the drought. 
 
The Government could, and did, draw on its experiences in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In April, a national Inter-Ministerial Drought Working Group had 
been established to monitor drought and co-ordinate responses (with the 
assistance later of separate dedicated committees. The drought was formally if 
belatedly acknowledged in May 1979, and the state (with the WFP) quickly 
mounted a large and ‘generally successful’ relief operation from June. 
Emergency water supplies were provided in ‘many villages’. Food aid to 
‘vulnerable groups’ and food-for-work programmes for able-bodied adults were 
rapidly expanded, reaching about 530,000 people (ibid: 5), i.e. about 80 percent 
of the population. The government also initiated a programme to pay for elderly 
or weak cattle, which were then culled, with the meat distributed as food aid. 
District and Village Drought Committees were established to assist the District 
Councils and Commissioners at the local level (Munemo, 2012: 144-50).  
 
The onset of drought was reflected in the new (fifth) National Development Plan 
for 1979-85, published in 1979. The Plan listed a long set of development 
projects to address drought (and a concurrent outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease) (see Table 1). The budget for 1979/80 alone would amount to close to 5 
million Pula, i.e. more than 1 percent of GDP. The largest budget items were 
food supplies, boreholes and water supplies, seed, cattle trucks to distribute 
food. These expenditures dwarfed the budgets allocated to the ongoing Remote 
Area Dwellers Programme (primarily for San) and the new Labour-Intensive 
Public Works Programme (see Table 2).67 The Labour-Intensive Public Works 
Programme, which had been proposed in the 1970s but was only implemented 
from 1982, represented the first attempt to institutionalise the public works 
																																								 																				
67 The 1979-85 National Development Plan (Botswana, 1979) sets out the capital and 
recurrent budgets for these two programmes. Over six years, the capital budgets for these 
programmes were 395,000 and 300,000 Pula respectively, giving a total over six years of 
about one-tenth of the emergency drought relief for one year; the reported recurrent budgets 
were tiny, at 8,000 and 15,000 Pula respectively, but I think that most of the recurrent cost 
entailed food provided by the WFP or other off-budget sources. 
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programme in non-drought years, reflecting the recognition (first made by 
Sandford) that destitution had become a chronic condition. 
 
The drought pushed the government also to formalise its ‘destitutes’ policy, i.e. 
provision for adults who were unable to work on food-for-work programmes. 
Hitherto, this has been the responsibility of District Commissioners and later 
District Councils, who had to formulate and implement their own policies with 
very limited financial support from the central government. In November 1980, 
the government published a new National Destitutes Policy, that included 
guidelines for the district-level Social Welfare Officers charged with 
implementing it. Individuals could be registered as destitute if they had neither 
assets (i.e. land, cash, livestock) nor kin and were “incapable of working” or had 
been “rendered helpless due to natural disaster or temporary hardship”. Food 
rations were modest. It seems that the new policy formalised what the 
government had in fact implemented in response to the drought of 1978-79. 
Critics reported that able-bodied adults had received destitute relief (presumably 
because they had been ‘rendered helpless’ by the drought).  
 
‘The 1979/80 relief programme revealed that free food distribution 
encouraged a sense of dependency, was damaging to individual self-
respect and human dignity, and possibly contributed to reduced 
agricultural production. Furthermore, attempts to select beneficiaries 
for relief food were extremely unpopular and very difficult to achieve’ 
(Gooch & Macdonald, 1981: 120). 
 
Notwithstanding Sandford’s report, benefits were provided in kind, with rations 
of food and other essential goods. Benefits were set at explicitly ‘minimum’ 
levels, and were discretionary, following an assessment by a social worker and 
registration as ‘destitute’. Only one person per household was eligible (except 
for very large households).  
 
In addition to moving towards a formal policy on destitutes, the distribution of 
food to ‘vulnerable groups’ was formalised as the Supplementary Feeding 
Programme (and later still evolved into what was called the Vulnerable Group 
Feeding Programme), run through the Ministry of Local Government (Munemo, 
2012: 142). Primary school fees were also abolished in 1980. Improved and 
planned food-for-work programmes became an integral component of 
Botswana’s nascent welfare state, through the Labour-Based Drought Relief 
Programme. In all cases, funds and food were controlled through central 
government. 
 
In the aftermath of the drought, the new Destitutes Policy was severely 
criticised. In a report for the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 
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Gooch & Macdonald urged that able-bodied adults should not be permitted to 
register as destitute. Instead, they should be required to work on relief work 
programmes. These should be self-targeted, meaning that they should pay a 
wage (of only 1 Pula/day) that “was low enough to discourage those who had 
alternative means of support from coming forward, while enabling those 
affected by the drought to survive”. The wage should certainly not be higher 
than the prevailing wage for unskilled labour in normal years. Gooch & 
Macdonald did recommend paying cash (rather than in kind), and found that the 
rations set out in the Destitute Policy were “insufficient for a working adult” 
(1981: 126-9). They recommended increased food rations to ‘vulnerable 
groups’, and out-of-term feeding for primary school children, large-scale relief 
works in all drought-affected villages, the expansion of the District Councils’ 
destitute programmes, and the provision of family rations to families in remote 
areas without access to clinics or relief works (ibid: 10-12). They also criticised 
severely the efficacy of the Institutional Food Programme, whose performance 
was found to have been ‘lamentable’ (ibid: 133). They recommended more 
devolution to District Councils, together with improved monitoring, contingency 
planning and general organisation. 
  
These were substantive criticisms, but their import was to modify rather than 
transform the design of public policy. The drought of 1978-79 certainly pushed 
the government of Botswana to institutionalise the remaining components of the 
country’s subsequent welfare, as Munemo (2012) emphasises, but the 
components had been pioneered and developed over the previous fifteen years. 
School children were fed routinely. Designated vulnerable groups were fed 
during periods of drought. Able-bodied adults were employed on food-for-work 
public works programmes. ‘Destitutes’ received modest food rations. A national 
inter-ministerial committee provided essential monitoring and co-ordination. 
Small farmers were the focus of agricultural extension efforts, and a dedicated 
programme addressed the challenges posed by the ‘remote’ (mostly Bushmen) 
poor. These public programmes were parsimonious: They staved off severe 
malnutrition but they did little to reduce either poverty or inequality. But they 
represented an important shift in the role and responsibilities of the state, a shift 
that was to lead to the elaboration of a more orthodox, if still conservative, 
welfare state in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The drought relief programme mounted in Botswana in the early 1980s has been 
widely cited as either an exemplary response to drought or the basis of the 
country’s conservative welfare state. The key features of the 1980s drought 
relief programme were, however, developed over the preceding fifteen years, 
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initially in response to the deepening drought of the early 1960s that enveloped 
Botswana at the time of independence, then through the difficult years of the late 
1960s and into the early 1970s, and even into the late 1970s despite improved 
rains. When drought recurred in 1978/79, the foundations of an effective relief 
programme were already in place. 
 
The scale of these drought relief programmes was enormous. Contemporary 
commentators (with varied interests) and later scholars differ in their estimates 
of precisely how many people were fed at what times. Khama himself told 
Parliament in April 1966 that the number of ‘destitutes’ receiving food had risen 
to 114,000, and was expected to rise to “well over half the population … before 
the next rainy season”. Sandford (1977: 1) reported that one-quarter of the 
population had been fed, whilst Colclough and McCarthy (1980: 54) reported 
one-fifth. Picard (1987) gave the highest estimate, at two-thirds of the 
population receiving food aid. Samatar (1999: 63) cites a contemporary source 
that puts the proportion at one-third.  
 
Some of this confusion reflects the figures presented to the WFP in applications 
for food, and then by the WFP in their estimates of the costs of meeting these 
requests. Many of these figures proved to be exaggerated. The first formal food-
for-work programme (WFP programme 323), for example, anticipated 
employing 60,000 adults ensuring a total of about 360,000 beneficiaries. But the 
actual average employment over the first six months was only about 30,000. On 
other occasions, the WFP’s estimates were exceeded, as in the late 1970s when 
the rapid expansion of public education meant that the school feeding 
programme expanded faster than anticipated. The reported data on actual 
disbursements of food suggest that the number of Batswana being fed rose 
rapidly to more than 100,000 during 1965 and (indirectly as well as directly) 
close to 200,000 during 1966, before dropping sharply during 1967. In 1968 and 
1969 the number rose again, again reaching close to 200,000 people (though 
both food-for-work and school feeding programmes). In the early 1970s the 
number drop by a little, but the growth of the school and ‘vulnerable group’ 
feeding programmes more than offset the absence of food-for-work. The 1973-
74 food-for-work programme pushed the total number above 200,000. The food-
for-work programme ended in 1974, but the continued expansion of the school 
and ‘vulnerable group’ feeding programmes reached about 220,000 people by 
1975, and 250,000 by 1979. These feeding programmes combined with a 
massive drought relief effort reportedly reached a total of 530,000 people ,  in 
1979-80. What this means is that the number of Batswana being fed rarely 
dropped below one-fifth of the population, was more often one-third, but did not 
reach one half until 1979-80. 
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The cost was substantial. Much of this cost was borne by the WFP. The cost in 
1966 of the WFP’s development and emergency programmes (including 
stockfeed) were the equivalent of about 2 percent of the GDP of Bechuanaland 
(Stevens, 1978). WFP programmes cost an average of about 1% of GDP each 
year over ten years. Over the ten years to 1975, the WFP spent a total of $26 
million, of which about $20 million was spent on food, and the remainder on 
infrastructural and administrative costs. Botswana received more WFP food aid 
per capita than any other country (Stevens, 1978). In the mid and late 1960s 
substantial costs were borne by the British, either directly (through dedicated 
expenditures) or indirectly (through general budget support to the Government 
of Botswana, which bore some of the cost). In the 1970s, domestic revenues 
raised within Botswana (increasingly from mining revenues) covered a rising 
share of the costs. When drought recurred in 1979, the Government budgeted 
almost 5 million Pula in emergency relief, under the National Development 
Plan. It is likely that the cost of relief between 1965 and 1979 varied between 1 
and 2 percent of GDP. The cost was not higher because the benefits – i.e. the 
food rations – were parsimonious. 
 
The Botswana ‘relief’ programmes were unusual solely on account of their 
character as well as their scale and duration. First, they were programmatic, 
albeit of a conservative nature providing benefits that were in kind (although 
there was some consideration of cash benefits in the 1970s) and parsimonious. 
They quickly evolved into three distinct programmes: food-for-work for the 
able-bodied (and their dependents), school feeding programmes, and the clinic-
based ‘vulnerable groups’ feeding programme. Between them they covered 
most, but not all of the poor. Adult ‘destitutes’ who were unable to work, for 
whatever reason, posed a chronic challenge. The design of public policy 
assumed that the elderly, infirm and disabled were supported by working kin. 
This assumption became less and less credible, placing a strain on food-for-
‘work’ programmes (as became clear in 1974-74). In 1980 the government 
formalised its Destitutes Policy, but the problem persisted, providing impetus to 
the introduction of old-age pensions in the 1990s. The small number of San 
remained discriminated against or even excluded from most of these 
programmes. 
 
The programmes were programmatic in a second sense, in that they were 
administered by a bureaucracy rather than as benefits at the discretion of chiefs 
or politicians. Seretse Khama himself had succeeded his grandfather and father 
as chief of the Bangwato at the age of four, with his uncle (Tshekedi Khama) 
serving as regent. After he married a British woman in 1948, the British 
Government exiled him to London and only allowed him to return to 
Bechuanaland in 1956 when he renounced the chieftaincy. Khama retained 
enormous legitimacy, especially among the Bangwato, but (with Masire) built 
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the BDP as a modernising party that was not only independent of the chiefs but 
also limited their role in government. Indeed, some chiefs played prominent 
roles in opposition parties (Tlou, Parsons & Henderson, 1995). Drought relief 
was administered by dedicated national and local bureaucracies, the latter 
working with Village Development Committees. In practice, the BDP used relief 
programmes to shore up its rural support base, but its patronage system was 
institutionalised rather than personalistic.  
 
By the time of independence (in late 1966), public policy in Botswana was 
distinctive. Contrary to Vaughan’s Africa-wide assessment, almost all Batswana 
(with the possible exception of the San) could count on the state supporting 
them in times of need, even if that support was very modest. This support was 
quickly institutionalised. Botswana was a pioneer within Africa in part because 
of the environmental and economic conditions. The arid environment exposed 
Botswana to drought more often and more deeply than most other Southern 
African countries. Economically, by the 1960s, drought generated famine 
because there were insufficient employment opportunities. It was in the 1970s 
that large-scale, open unemployment became evident across the border in South 
Africa (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005). Whilst rapid economic growth in Botswana 
mitigated this, it is likely that unemployment became significant in Botswana at 
much the same time.  
 
Botswana was distinctive for political reasons also. The BDP was committed to 
modernisation, but also held onto a conservative ideology of social harmony and 
justice. The coincidence of drought, enduring poverty and rising prosperity 
served to frame the development of the BDP’s distinctive ideology (Seekings, 
2016b). Like many of their contemporaries in post-colonial Africa, Khama and 
Masire were preoccupied primarily with decolonisation, nation- and state-
building. Khama and Masire staked out a strong position on the abolition of 
racial discrimination and the appointment of Batswana to positions in 
government. They were also repeatedly distracted by the immense challenges of 
being on the apartheid frontline. But drought compelled them to confront issues 
of poverty, whilst social and economic change forced them to consider what 
kind of a society they hoped Botswana would become. Under Khama’s 
leadership, the BDP elaborated an ideology of social justice built around a 
doctrine of parsimonious but extensive welfare provision. They articulated the 
ideal of a harmonious society, in which education and agricultural extension 
provided the poor with opportunities to improve their lives, the poor had to 
contribute to self-help, and the state assisted them (modesty) if they faltered 
through no fault of their own. Public and individual responsibilities would thus 
be balanced. This idealised society was not egalitarian, but inequalities should 
not lead to conflict. This ideology was explicitly rooted in Setswana concepts, 
especially kagisano, meaning harmony and well-being, but had much in 
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common with the kinds of progressive conservatism associated with ‘one nation’ 
in Britain and Christian democrats in continental Europe. 
 
“A lean cow cannot climb out of the mud, but a good cattleman does not leave it 
to perish”, proclaimed a Tswana proverb quoted by Khama in 1974, 
summarising his political philosophy. Mud, however, was not the usual problem 
in Botswana. The Khama presidency was bookended by very severe drought, 
that not only resulted in negligible harvests but also decimated cattle herds 
(especially in the smaller herds owned by small farmers). The experience of 
drought shaped the doctrine of benign conservatism developed by Khama, 
Masire and the BDP. Affecting the whole of society – including the owners of 
large cattle herds – drought required state action, at a time when scarce public 
resources necessitated also ‘self-help’. It especially threatened rural society, 
exposing not only the limits to an agrarian model for society but also the failures 
of the market. It encouraged policy-makers to worry about – and ‘modernise’ – 
agricultural production and productivity, but neither new techniques nor 
‘villagisation’ nor even boreholes would prevent drought in future, which meant 
that this was an impetus to welfare state-building and not just ‘development’. As 
in the USA, drought was a natural disaster, and the ensuing famine and hardship 
could not be blamed on the poor themselves. 
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Appendix 1: WFP programmes in Botswana, 
1965-1980 
 
No. Programme (and type) Approved Cost Duration 
824 Emergency Operation (food relief) 
May, July, 
October and 
December 1965  
$3.4m 
(increased 
from 
initial 
$0.4m) 
12 months: 
July 1965 – 
June 1966 
323 
Community 
Development and Tsetse 
Fly Control (food-for-
work) 
April 1966 $5.9m 
15 months: 
July 1966 – 
Sep 1967 
324 
Supplementary feeding 
programme for school-
children, mothers and 
pre-school children 
April 1966, with 
three subsequent 
amendments 
$6.5m 
(increased 
from 
initial 
$5.5m) 
5 years, 
extended to a 
sixth year: 
June 1966 - 
June 1972 
340 Livestock feeding scheme 
April 1966, 
extended 
$1.2m 
committed 
5 months, 
extended to 1 
year: July 
1966 - July 
1967 
861 
Emergency Operation: 
Aid to drought (food-
for-work) 
25 March 1968; 
extended 7 Feb 
1969; later 
extended again 
< $1m 
(initially) 
plus 
$0.4m 
(extension
) 
10 months, 
extended by 
a further 3, 
then 
extended by 
1 more: April 
1968 - June 
1969 
564 
Community 
Development in 
Drought-Stricken Areas 
(food-for-work) 
June 1969 $1.5m July 1969 to August 1970 
564 
EX
P 
Community 
Development … (food-
for-work) 
Sep 1970 $0.9m Sep 1970 to May 1971 
324 
EX
P 
Supplementary feeding 
programme … 
April 1971; later 
extended twice 
$21.3m 
(up from 
initial 
$8.8m) 
5 years from 
July 1972, 
extended by 
2 years, 
	
	
	 45 
extended by 
another 6 
months, to 
Dec 1979 
610 
Institutional Feeding 
(secondary schools, 
Youth Brigades) 
April 1970 $1.1m 
5 years: June 
1971 to 
March 1976 
207
4Q 
Agricultural 
Improvement for Small 
Farmers Threatened by 
Drought 
Feb 1973 
Very 
small, and 
only one-
third was 
spent 
Nov 1973 to 
Mar 1974 
995 Emergency Operation (food-for-work) August 1973 $0.35 
6 months: 
Oct 1973 to 
March 1974 
247
8Q Assistance to Refugees Sep 1978 $3.5m 
6 years from 
Jan 1979 
324 
EX
P II 
Supplementary feeding 
programme … May 1979 
$42.5m 
(up from 
initial 
$22.4m) 
Initially 3 
years from 
Jan 1980; 
extended to 5 
years, ending 
Dec 1984 
Note: The dollar/pound exchange rate was stable at $2.8: £1 until the end of 
1967, and at $2.4: £1 until 1972. During the 1970s it rose and fell, averaging 
about $2: £1. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
Table 1: Budget for emergency drought relief (and relief of foot-and-
mouth disease) 
 
Project 
Budget (000 
Pula) Description 
1979/80  1980/81 
DR 01 350  Boreholes, water, kraals etc 
DR 02 450  Cattle trucks to be used for drought relief (NW) 
DR 11 295  Diesel fuel subsidy for boreholes 
DR 12 100  Purchase of old and weak cattle in Ngamiland 
(NW), at P50/beast, meat to go to feeding 
programmes: 1 beast/village and 1/school per 
week; target = 2000 cattle 
DR 13 9.5  F&MD: buffalo fence in Ngamiland (NW) 
DR 14 12.6  Labour-intensive firebreak clearance 
DR 16 100  Irrigation and flood-control in NW 
DR 17 270  Labour-intensive destumping in NW 
DR 18 25  Water supplies in NW 
DR 05 174  Botulism vaccines to reduce drought-related cattle 
mortality 
DR 04 586  Emergency seed supply 
DR 19 31.6  Labour-intensive work in game reserves in NW 
DR 15 119.7  Employment to hunt game in NW; also to supply 
meat to drought-affected populations 
DR 03 250 217 Trucks etc to deliver food aid 
DR 20 100 57 LIPW projects in NW 
DR 21 57  LIPW projects in Central District 
DR 09 1000 1217 Food supplies and some cash relief 
DR 08 600 702 Boreholes (including minor recurrent expenditure) 
DR 22 115  Grants to schools in NW etc, in compensation for 
fees, cancelled for 1979 by presidential directive 
Note: These are in addition to relatively modest multi-year allocations to 
regular budget line items including Labour-Intensive Public Works (LG 38) and 
Remote Area Dwellers Programme (LG 32), both operated by the Ministry of 
Local Government (see Table 2). 
NW is North-West (region). 
Source: NDP 1979-1985, Part II. 
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Table 2 
 
 LIPW Scheme (LG 38) Remote Area Dwellers Prog (LG 32) 
Year Capital 
expenditure 
(000 Pula) 
Recurrent 
expenditure 
(000 Pula) 
Capital 
expenditure 
(000 Pula) 
Recurrent 
expenditure 
(000 Pula) 
1979/80 20 - 20 1 
1980/81 40 2 40 2 
1981/82 65 2 60 3 
1982/83 90 2 60 3 
1983/84 90 2 60 3 
1984/85 90 - 60 3 
Total (6 
years) 395 8 300 15 
 Note: Emergency drought relief = sum of items in Table 1 above. 
 Source: NDP 1979-1985, Part II. 
 
